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Abstract 
We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team 
performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group 
incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchical 
mechanism (team output is allocated by a team leader). We find that output is higher when a 
leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences 
between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how 
much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader they 
tend to restrict the leader’s power to distributing less than half of the pie. 
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1. Introduction 
Many organizations are hierarchical in structure, where leaders have power over subordinates 
and can influence them, and hence organizational performance, in a variety of ways. Vast 
literatures in management and social psychology have studied various dimensions of 
leadership. Bass and Bass (2008) extensively survey the literatures on leadership and broadly 
classify theories of leadership as informal (dealing with the emergence of leaders who lack 
formal authority), inspirational (focusing on leaders’ ideological or emotional appeals to 
followers’ intrinsic motivation), or instrumental (focusing on outcome-directed leaders who 
have formal disciplining powers). Our paper contributes to the latter class of theories, in 
particular by examining the role of contingent-positive reinforcement, whereby a leader 
encourages compliance from subordinates by appealing to their self-interested response to 
material rewards. In fact, reward power is often recognized as a crucial dimension of 
leadership (see, e.g., French and Raven, 1959; Yukl, 1989) and is indeed a cardinal principle 
of the path-goal and operant conditioning approaches to leadership, that posit that whether a 
leader can successfully motivate followers depends on her ability to make rewards contingent 
on followers’ performance  (Jago, 1982). Relatedly, Hermalin (2013) surveys the leadership 
literature from an economic perspective and discusses various roles of leaders, one of which 
is to be responsible for monitoring and administering incentives within a group.  
Although the use of rewards may successfully motivate subordinates, the availability 
of leadership reward power may introduce other sorts of incentive problems. Most obviously, 
opportunistic leaders may have an incentive to abuse their power and use group resources to 
advance their private interest. This threat of opportunism may have less force when the 
allocation of power is endogenous within the organization, e.g. when subordinates have a say 
on how much power is invested in the leader. In such cases, will leaders resist the temptation 
to abuse their power, and will subordinates be able to correctly anticipate the benefits, as well 
as potential perils, of leadership, and thus voluntarily grant power to the leader? This is an 
important question, especially because in some theories of leadership (e.g., Fiedler, 1967’s 
contingency model of leadership) the effectiveness of a leader does not merely depend on her 
traits and behaviors, but also on the “favorableness of the leadership situation”, including the 
availability of position power, i.e. the extent to which the leader is vested with authority to 
“… direct, evaluate, reward and punish group members” (Jago, 1982; p. 323).  
In this paper we examine these issues using the methodology of experimental 
economics. Thus, we contribute to the existing management and social psychology literature, 
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that have documented positive correlations between contingent-positive reinforcements and 
subordinates’ performance (for reviews see, e.g., Podsakoff and Schriesheim, 1985; 
Podsakoff et al., 2006), by designing tightly-controlled laboratory experiments that allow for 
causal inferences and where subjects’ decisions are elicited in an incentive-compatible way.1 
Our experimental design begins with a 10-round repeated team production game 
where team members incur individual effort costs but share team output equally with all team 
members. Since the benefits of a team member’s efforts are shared with the rest of the team 
this introduces an externality that will result in excessive shirking and welfare loss if 
decisions are guided by a comparison of private costs and benefits. Thus, our model of team 
production follows the tradition of using a Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) to 
capture the essence of the free-rider problem in teams (see Charness and Kuhn, 2011 for a 
review of this approach).2 We observe substantial free-riding in this baseline treatment, in 
line with the large experimental literature on VCM games (see for example the recent review 
in Camerer and Weber, 2012).  
Next, we ask whether installing a leader who allocates rewards to team members 
improves team performance. To do this we conduct treatments that complement and extend 
the recent experimental work on leadership with distributive power by Heijden et al. (2009) 
and Stoddard et al. (2014). In these treatments all team output accrues to a leader, who can 
decide how to distribute it after observing individual team members’ efforts. Importantly, any 
output not allocated to other team members is retained by the leader. In this setting, a leader 
might induce efficient team production by compensating team members appropriately for the 
costs they incur from their productive efforts, and furthermore she has an incentive to do so 
as efficient team production will increase her residual claim. However, leaders also have an 
incentive to appropriate all the team output for themselves. In theory, assuming standard 
selfish preferences, a leader will keep all team output and, in anticipation of this, team 
members supply minimum effort. In contrast to this theoretical prediction, but in line with 
previous experimental work, in our experiment we find that installing a leader does indeed 
promote effort and increase efficiency. Leaders use simple strategies that reward workers 
                                                          
1 A word of caution about external validity is necessary. In order to observe behavior in a controlled 
environment we use abstract settings that remove many of the complexities present in the field. Moreover, in 
natural organizations individuals self-select into leadership positions, a feature that is absent in our study. Thus, 
caution should be exercised in extrapolating insights from our lab setting to naturally-occurring environments. 
2 See also Guillen et al. (2014) for a discussion of the close relation between team production and VCM games. 
Bartling et al. (2010) provide a behavioral foundation for the use of the equal sharing rule in team production 
settings. 
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who supply high effort and withhold rewards from shirkers. This in turn encourages effort 
and results in substantial increases in team production and earnings.  
Successful leadership may be more challenging when, as in many natural settings, 
workers vary in their productivity. Indeed, related experiments have shown that asymmetries 
between workers reduce the effectiveness of other forms of leader power (Levati et al. 2007). 
In our context, what constitutes “compensating team members appropriately” may be less 
straightforward if productivities vary among workers. Should compensation reflect the costs 
that a worker incurs from her efforts, or the output that she produces? If workers are 
concerned about equity and fairness, and if there are competing notions of fairness, it may be 
particularly difficult to provide the correct incentives. Thus, we also ran treatments with 
heterogeneous worker productivities. Again, we find low effort in the absence of a leader and 
substantially higher effort and efficiency with a leader. Thus, just as in the case of 
homogeneous teams, with heterogeneous teams we find that installing a leader with power to 
distribute the proceeds of team production is successful in promoting efficiency.  
However, in both homogeneous and heterogeneous teams, we also find that the gains of 
leadership are distributed asymmetrically within a team: leaders reap most of the gains, but 
team members are no better off with than without a leader. This raises the question whether 
team members would actually prefer to install a leader if they could choose to do so.3  
This question cannot be addressed in our initial treatments because a feature of these 
treatments is that the institutional setting – either a group incentive scheme or a leader reward 
scheme – is exogenously imposed on a team as part of our experimental design. Therefore, 
we designed further treatments to examine the endogenous emergence of the leadership 
institution. In these treatments we ask whether in our setting team members will voluntarily 
cede reward power to a leader, and whether this affects the leader’s performance in terms of 
encouraging team production. To do this, we allowed team members to repeatedly decide 
what proportion of team output will be given to the leader to distribute, with the remainder 
shared equally among the team members. 
Making the leader’s power endogenous in this way could represent an obstacle to 
successful leadership. Even if a leader would be willing and able to compensate workers, 
team members may not support leadership because they fail to anticipate the leader’s 
behavior, or because they prefer to retain some control over part of their earnings from 
                                                          
3 This is a key question also in the social psychology and management literatures, which have studied 
extensively the conditions under which group members prefer to appoint a leader to solve the free-rider 
problem, see, e.g., Messick and Brewer (1983); Samuelson (1991); van Vugt and De Cremer (1999).   
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providing effort. This may reflect a non-pecuniary benefit from partially controlling 
incentives, similar to the desire to retain authority seen in other studies of principal-agent 
relationships (e.g., Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Fehr et al., 2013; Bartling et al., 2014). 
On the other hand, the endogenous emergence of leadership may facilitate its success. First, it 
gives team members an opportunity to punish leaders who abuse their power, and so it may 
be a useful mechanism for constraining opportunistic leaders.4 Second, as seen in other 
studies of endogenous institutions (e.g., Dal Bó et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2010) giving agents 
a voice in the institution may in and of itself foster a more cooperative environment.  
We find that, as in our previous treatments, team production and earnings are higher 
when leaders are given more power. However, despite the success of the leadership 
institution when it emerges, we find that team members delegate too little power to leaders 
and so the potential gains from leadership are not realized. The main reason for this appears 
to be the way the benefits of leadership are shared. Although the leaders’ rewarding strategies 
are well-calibrated to make it pay to work rather than shirk, the rents from work go mainly to 
the leader. That is, the leader rewards enough to compensate team members for their effort 
costs, but takes the lion’s share of any remaining output. Given that team members do 
slightly better than predicted under group incentives, the leaders’ rewarding strategies do not 
make leadership an attractive proposition.  
Overall, our study shows that concentrating reward power in the hands of a leader can 
have beneficial effects on team production and efficiency. However, we also find that 
opportunism and abuse of power are tangible impediments to the success of leadership. This 
issue may be particularly serious in settings where leaders are endogenously appointed by 
team members, as the fear of exploitation may induce subordinates to resist delegation of 
agency to central authorities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our initial 
2x2 design where we vary across treatments (i) the presence or absence of a leader, and (ii) 
whether team members are homogeneous or heterogeneous in their productivities. In Section 
3 we present two additional treatments (with either homogeneous or heterogeneous 
productivities) where the leader’s reward power is delegated by team members. In Section 4 
we discuss how our results compare with other experimental findings, and conclude. 
                                                          
4 Also see Bartling et al. (2013) on the use and abuse of power in employment contracts, and the means for 
agents to resist power exploitation by the principal.  
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2. Study 1: The effectiveness of exogenously imposed leadership 
2.1 Experiment design 
In our initial study we examine the effectiveness of exogenously imposed leadership using a 
ten-round, five-person team production game. Teams are randomly formed in the first round 
and remain fixed across rounds. Within each team, four subjects are randomly assigned the 
role of "worker" and one subject the role of "leader", and these roles are kept fixed across 
rounds.5 Subjects earned points in each round and at the end of each round were informed 
about all decisions and earnings for all team members for the round, as well as accumulated 
point earnings from the current and previous rounds. At the end of the game subjects were 
paid based on their accumulated point earnings from all rounds. 
Each round consists of two stages. In stage one each worker is endowed with 10 tokens 
and chooses how many to contribute to team production. Worker choices are made 
simultaneously. Leaders are also endowed with 10 tokens but they cannot contribute these to 
team production. Each token kept by a team member yields 30 points to that member, 
whereas each token contributed to team production by worker i generates 𝜃𝑖 points of "team 
output". We will refer to contributions of tokens in terms of the supply of “effort”, though we 
recognize that this stylized setting where efforts correspond to a chosen number differs from 
natural settings in many ways. Importantly, however, our chosen effort design means that 
supplying “effort” in our experiment is individually costly in a tangible and transparent way 
and allows us to control the effort cost function. We adopted constant marginal costs and 
constant marginal productivity of effort for simplicity (see Falk and Fehr, 2003 for a 
discussion of the relative merits of chosen effort and real effort designs).  
In stage two of each round the team output is redistributed among team members 
according to the following rules: a share 𝛾 of the team output (0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1) is transferred to 
the team leader who decides how to redistribute the output among all team members 
(including the leader), and the remaining share 1 − 𝛾 of team output is equally redistributed 
among the four workers. The leader is informed of the individual efforts in stage one before 
making her redistribution decisions by assigning reward points to workers. The point 
earnings of the team members are as follows: 
                                                          
5 We did not use the labels "worker" and "leader" in the instructions. Instead, subjects were identified through 
letters A to E and group members A to D acted as workers and group member E as leader in the experiment. The 
instructions are reproduced in Appendix A. 
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𝜋𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 300 +  𝛾 ⋅ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑒𝑖
4
𝑖=1
− ∑ 𝑟𝑖
4
𝑖=1
 
𝜋𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑖 = 300 − 30𝑒𝑖 +
1 − 𝛾
4
⋅ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑒𝑖
4
𝑖=1
+ 𝑟𝑖 
where 𝑒𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, … , 10} denotes worker 𝑖's effort in stage one and 𝑟𝑖 denotes the reward 
points assigned by the leader to worker i in stage two. The leader cannot assign negative 
rewards, 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0, and total rewards cannot exceed the share of team output controlled by the 
leader, ∑ 𝑟𝑖
4
𝑖=1 ≤ 𝛾 ⋅ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑒𝑖
4
𝑖=1 . At the end of each round all team members are informed of all 
stage one and stage two choices, and the resulting payoffs.  
This initial study has four treatments in a 2x2 between-subject design. In our NoLeader 
treatments leaders have no reward power: no share of team output is transferred to the leader 
(i.e., 𝛾 = 0), the leader cannot assign any rewards (i.e., 𝑟𝑖 = 0) and all team output is equally 
shared by the four workers. In our Leader treatments leaders have instead full reward power 
as they receive the whole team output to redistribute (i.e., 𝛾 = 1).6 In our Homogeneous 
treatments productivity is homogeneous within a team, i.e. for all workers each unit of effort 
generates 𝜃𝑖 = 60 points of team output. In our Heterogeneous treatments workers are 
heterogeneous in their productivity: two workers have high productivity (𝜃𝑖 = 80), while the 
other two have low productivity (𝜃𝑖 = 40). Table 1 summarizes the design of the experiment. 
Table 1 – Study 1 experimental design 
Treatment 
Share of team 
output redistributed 
by leader (𝛾) 
Workers' productivity (𝜃𝑖) 
Number 
of 
subjects 
(teams) 
NoLeader_Homogeneous 𝛾 = 0 𝜃𝑖 = 60 for 𝑖 = {1, 2, 3, 4} 60 (12) 
Leader_Homogeneous 𝛾 = 1 𝜃𝑖 = 60 for 𝑖 = {1, 2, 3, 4} 60 (12) 
NoLeader_Heterogeneous 𝛾 = 0 
𝜃𝑖 = 80 for 𝑖 = {1,2} and 𝜃𝑖 = 40 for 𝑖 =
{3,4} 
55 (11) 
Leader_Heterogeneous 𝛾 = 1 
𝜃𝑖 = 80 for 𝑖 = {1,2} and 𝜃𝑖 = 40 for 𝑖 =
{3,4} 
55 (11) 
 
In all treatments team output is maximized when workers supply maximum effort. 
However, assuming that it is common knowledge that players maximize own earnings, 
workers have no incentive to supply effort in any of the treatments. Consider a one-round 
                                                          
6 In the NoLeader treatments leaders have no decision-making role and simply observe the decisions of the other 
group members. This “dummy” player is included to enhance comparability with the Leader treatment. 
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version of our team production game. In the NoLeader treatment, the game is a standard 
VCM game where a self-interested worker has a dominant strategy to provide zero effort. In 
our Leader treatments a self-interested leader will keep any team output produced by the 
workers and, anticipating this, workers do not supply any effort in stage one. These 
predictions for the single round game also carry over to the finitely repeated game: in the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium workers provide zero effort in every round. 
However, there is by now abundant evidence that not all individuals are exclusively 
motivated by their self-interest (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006 for reviews). 
In a one-shot game without a leader, workers may supply effort to team production if they have 
other-regarding preferences (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Moreover, in a repeated 
version even selfishly motivated workers may supply effort in early rounds, if they believe that 
some workers have other–regarding preferences. Thus, the combination of repetition and 
incomplete information about preferences can sustain rational cooperation for several rounds 
(Kreps et al., 1982). Likewise, in the one-shot game with a leader, a leader with other-regarding 
preferences may be willing to reward workers for their effort in such a way that even a selfish 
worker finds it pays to supply effort (see Drouvelis et al., 2015). In the repeated game, a selfish 
leader may act in this way in early rounds for strategic reasons, waiting until towards the end 
of the game to exploit the workers (see Heijden et al., 2009 for a formal model).  
2.2 Experiment procedures 
The experiments were carried out at [OMITTED FOR PEER REVIEW] with 230 subjects 
recruited from a campus-wide distribution list.7 Three sessions were conducted for each 
treatment, with either 20 or 15 subjects per session. No subject participated in more than one 
session. We had 60 subjects participate in each of our Homogeneous treatments, and 55 
subjects participate in each of our Heterogeneous treatments.  
At the beginning of a session, subjects were randomly allocated to visually-isolated 
computer terminals. They received written instructions that the experimenter read aloud. The 
instructions contained a set of control questions to test subjects' understanding of the 
experimental setting. Answers were checked in private by the experimenter. Once all subjects 
had answered all questions correctly, they were randomly allocated to teams and randomly 
assigned a role within the team. Subjects then played 10 rounds of the team production game 
described above.  
                                                          
7 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was 
computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
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At the end of round 10, subjects filled in a short questionnaire eliciting basic socio-
demographic information. Subjects were then paid in cash and in private according to the 
sum of their earnings across the 10 rounds at a rate of £0.10 per 100 points, plus a £3.50 
show-up fee. Earnings ranged between £6.18 and £14.47, averaging £7.76. On average 
sessions lasted about 75 minutes.  
2.3 Results 
We analyze our results using non-parametric tests and regressions. All reported p-values are 
two-sided and, for non-parametric tests, we use the team average as the independent unit of 
observation unless otherwise stated, so that we have 12 (Homogeneous treatments) and 11 
(Heterogeneous treatments) observations per treatment. Figure 1 shows the average effort 
supplied by workers across our four treatments. In round 1 efforts range from 48% to 58% 
across treatments, but these differences are not statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test: p 
= 0.588).8 Marked differences between treatments then emerge from round 2 onwards: efforts 
gradually decrease over rounds in our NoLeader treatments, whereas they increase in our 
Leader treatments. This pattern is observed both in the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous 
treatments. In round 10 of all treatments we observe an end-game drop in effort, which is 
particularly sharp in our Leader treatments. 
Figure 1 - Average effort across treatments 
   
Averaging across all rounds, subjects supply about 30% and 31% of maximum possible 
effort in NoLeader_Homogeneous and NoLeader_Heterogeneous, respectively. In contrast, 
                                                          
8 This test is based on 48 individual observations in each of our NoLeader_Homogeneous and 
Leader_Homogeneous treatments, and 44 individual observations in each of our NoLeader_Heterogeneous 
and Leader_Heterogeneous treatments. 
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average effort is substantially higher in the treatments with leader: 76% of maximum possible 
effort in Leader_Homogeneous and 70% in Leader_Heterogeneous. These differences 
between treatments with and without leaders are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney tests: 
NoLeader_Homogeneous vs. Leader_Homogeneous p < 0.001; NoLeader_Heterogeneous 
vs. Leader_Heterogeneous p = 0.001). Thus, replacing the group incentive scheme of our 
No_Leader treatment with the discretionary incentives of our Leader treatment increases 
effort by 46 percentage points in homogeneous teams and by 39 percentage points in 
heterogeneous teams. 
Note that the Leader and NoLeader treatments differ in two dimensions: 1) whether 
leaders receive a share of the total output; and 2) whether they have reward power.9 To 
estimate the impact of each dimension on our treatment effect, we conducted additional 
control treatments identical to the NoLeader condition except that the leader also receives a 
share of team output (team output is shared equally among the five group members). We 
conducted two sessions with 30 subjects in Control_Homogeneous (6 independent 
observations) and two sessions with 35 subjects in Control_Heterogeneous (7 independent 
observations). We find that team output in these control treatments is significantly lower than 
in our NoLeader treatments (12% in both Homogeneous and Heterogeneous, averaging 
across all rounds; Mann-Whitney tests: p = 0.007 NoLeader_Homogeneous vs. 
Control_Homogeneous; p = 0.001 NoLeader_Heterogeneous vs. Control_Heterogeneous).10 
Thus, relative to our No_Leader treatment, giving the leader an equal share of output, but no 
reward power, reduces effort by 18 percentage points in Homogeneous and by 19 percentage 
points in Heterogeneous teams. Relative to the control treatments, where all team members 
including the leader get an equal share of output, we find that replacing group incentives with 
discretionary incentives increases effort by 64 percentage points in homogeneous teams and 
by 58 percentage points in heterogeneous teams.   
It is interesting to observe that the effectiveness of leadership does not seem to be 
diminished in the treatments with heterogeneous worker productivities. In fact, we observe 
very similar efforts in homogeneous and heterogeneous teams (Mann-Whitney tests: 
NoLeader_Homogeneous vs. NoLeader_Heterogeneous p = 0.580; Leader_Homogeneous 
vs. Leader_Heterogeneous p = 0.853). Within the Heterogeneous treatments, we observe 
only small differences in effort between workers with high and low productivity. Averaging 
                                                          
9 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
10 These tests are based on comparisons between 12 and 6 observations in the Homogeneous treatments and 11 
and 7 observations in the Heterogeneous treatments. See Appendix B for additional analysis of these treatments.  
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across rounds of our NoLeader treatment, high productivity workers supply 34% of 
maximum possible effort, while low productivity workers supply 28%. High productivity 
workers supply more effort in our Leader treatment as well, 73% compared with 66% by low 
productivity workers. However, none of these differences are statistically significant 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: high vs. low productivity workers p = 0.477 in 
NoLeader_Heterogeneous and p = 0.286 in Leader_Heterogeneous).11 
Overall, these findings suggest that in our Leader treatments leaders use their reward 
power effectively and adopt redistribution strategies that induce workers to contribute to team 
output. But how do leaders distribute rewards across team members? In Tables 2 and 3 we 
start addressing this question by plotting the average share of team output received by 
workers disaggregated by level of effort. Table 2 presents data from the Homogeneous 
treatment, while Table 3 presents data from the Heterogeneous treatment, distinguishing 
between high and low productivity workers. The tables distinguish between cases where a 
worker’s own effort is above or below the average effort of the rest of their team in a given 
round of the experiment.12  
The tables show that leaders reward relatively high effort with higher shares of team 
output. In Homogeneous workers who supply low effort (0 to 4 units) receive on average 
between 4% and 17% of team output. In contrast, workers who supply high effort (5 units or 
more) receive between 17% and 22% of team output. Similarly, in Heterogeneous high 
productivity workers who supply low effort receive between 5% and 15% of team output, 
whereas high productivity workers supplying high effort receive between 18% and 21% of 
team output. Similar patterns emerge for low productivity workers: low effort receives 
between 2% and 17% of team output, while high effort receives between 16% and 21%. In 
both treatments, the differences between shares of team output assigned to workers who 
supply low and high effort are highly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p = 0.002 for 
Homogeneous; p = 0.004 for Heterogeneous high productivity workers; p = 0.007 for 
Heterogeneous low productivity workers). Notably, leaders assign similar rewards to low and 
high productivity workers. On average, low and high productivity workers receive 17% and 
                                                          
11 These tests use average effort across the 10 rounds computed separately for high and low productivity 
workers within a team. This generates a set of 11 paired observations that we use as the independent unit of 
observation. The Wilcoxon signed-rank tests reported elsewhere in the paper are performed in a similar fashion. 
12 In the tables we focus on shares of team output instead of the number of reward points received by workers to 
account for the fact that the amount of reward points that the leader can redistribute to workers is endogenous 
and depends on the amount of team output produced.  
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18% of team output, respectively. The difference is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p = 0.424).  
Table 2 – Share of team output received by effort level - Homogeneous 
Worker’s effort 
At or above 
average team effort 
Below average 
team effort 
Overall 
0 
- 
(0) 
0.04 
(39) 
0.04 
(39) 
1 or 2 
0.28 
(3) 
0.11 
(18) 
0.13 
(21) 
3 or 4 
0.25 
(10) 
0.14 
(24) 
0.17 
(34) 
5 or 6 
0.25 
(17) 
0.13 
(28) 
0.17 
(45) 
7 or 8 
0.28 
(35) 
0.17 
(26) 
0.23 
(61) 
9 or 10 
0.22 
(264) 
0.17 
(16) 
0.22 
(280) 
Notes: The number of underlying observations is reported in parentheses.  
Table 3 – Share of team output received by effort level - Heterogeneous 
Worker’s effort 
At or above 
average team effort 
Below average 
team effort 
Overall 
0 
- / - 
(2) / (2) 
0.05 / 0.02 
(28) / (14) 
0.05 / 0.02 
(30) / (16) 
1 or 2 
0.05 / 0.16 
(2) / (3) 
0.10 / 0.12 
(11) / (13) 
0.09 / 0.13 
(13) / (16) 
3 or 4 
0.14 / 0.20 
(5) / (7) 
0.15 / 0.14 
(25) / (10) 
0.15 / 0.17 
(30) / (17) 
5 or 6 
0.19 / 0.17 
(12) / (9) 
0.17 / 0.16 
(9) / (21) 
0.18 / 0.16 
(21) / (30) 
7 or 8 
0.21 / 0.24 
(7) / (14) 
0.12 / 0.16 
(5) / (5) 
0.17 / 0.22 
(12) / (19) 
9 or 10 
0.21 / 0.22 
(111) / (120) 
0.15 / 0.03 
(3) / (2) 
0.21 / 0.21 
(114) / (122) 
Notes: The first numbers of each cell refer to high productivity workers and the second 
numbers refer to low productivity workers. The number of underlying observations is 
reported in parentheses. Note that we have two groups where all workers exerted effort 
equal to 0 (column 2) and so the leader had no team output to allocate. 
Tables 2 and 3 also show that the share of team output assigned to a worker depends 
not just on that worker’s effort, but also on how that compares to the effort of other team 
members. For instance, in Homogeneous, workers who exert low levels of effort receive on 
average between 4% and 14% of team output when their effort is below the average effort in 
their team. However, when the same levels of effort are at or above the team average, they 
are rewarded with 25% to 28% of team output. In fact, for any category of effort in Table 2, 
13 
 
workers always receive a larger reward when their effort is at or above, rather than below, the 
team average. Analogous patterns emerge in Table 3 for the Heterogeneous treatment, for 
both low and high productivity workers.  
The relation between a worker’s effort and average effort in their team is illustrated in 
Figure 2, which shows the average share of team output received by workers in each 
treatment, disaggregated based on how their efforts relate to the average effort in their team. 
The figure also shows the average share of team output received by leaders in each treatment.  
Figure 2 – Share of team output received 
    
Figure 2 clearly shows that leaders follow a strategy that rewards contributions and 
punishes free-riding in both Leader treatments. In Homogeneous, workers who supply effort 
at or above the average of their team in a round receive on average 23% of team production, 
while those supplying effort below the average receive 12% of team production. These 
differences are highly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.002). The same pattern is 
observed in the Heterogeneous treatment, for both high and low productivity workers. Here, 
high productivity workers who supply effort at or above the team average receive on average 
21% of team production, while those supplying effort below the team average receive 11% of 
team production (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.004). Similarly, low productivity workers 
receive on average 20% of team production when their effort is at or above the team average, 
and 10% when it is below the average (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.007). 
Overall, these results suggest that leaders provide strong incentives for effort provision, 
both in our Homogeneous and Heterogeneous treatments. We conclude our analysis by 
studying the impact of leadership on earnings and efficiency. For a measure of efficiency we 
use attained team earnings in excess of Nash equilibrium earnings as a percentage of 
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maximum possible excess earnings. Table 4 reports individual earnings, combined earnings, 
and efficiencies per round across treatments. 
Table 4 – Individual earnings and efficiency 
 NoLeader 
Homogeneous 
Leader 
Homogeneous 
NoLeader 
Heterogeneous 
Leader 
Heterogeneous 
Leader’s Earnings 
300 
(0.0) 
686.8 
(203.4) 
300 
(0.0) 
746.0 
(190.8) 
Workers’ Earnings 
390.6 
(38.9) 
430.2 
(57.1) 
- - 
Low Productivity   
407.1 
(62.8) 
406.4 
(68.4) 
High Productivity   
389.5 
(38.6) 
401.2 
(60.2) 
Combined Earnings 
1862.5 
(155.6) 
2407.5 
(193.7) 
1893 
(174.1) 
2361.3 
(220.5) 
Efficiency 30% 76% 33% 72% 
Notes: “Combined Earnings” are the sum of leader’s and workers’ earnings. “Efficiency” is 
computed as (combined earnings – 1500) / (2700 – 1500), where 1500 are the theoretical earnings 
under zero contributions and 2700 are maximum possible combined earnings. Standard deviations 
based on team averages in parentheses.  
The earnings analysis confirms the effectiveness of leadership in promoting this 
measure of efficiency in our team production setting. In the Homogeneous treatment 
combined earnings increase from 1862.5 when leaders have no reward power (an efficiency 
of 30%) to 2407.5 when leaders have reward power (an efficiency of 76%). This difference is 
statistically significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (NoLeader_Homogeneous vs. 
Leader_Homogeneous p < 0.001). Similarly, in the Heterogeneous treatment combined 
earnings increase from 1893 when leaders have no reward power (an efficiency of 33%) to 
2361.3 when leaders have reward power (an efficiency of 72%). This difference is 
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test: NoLeader_Heterogeneous vs. 
Leader_Heterogeneous p = 0.001).13 
Table 4, however, also shows that the efficiency gains of leadership are redistributed 
very unequally between leaders and workers: most of the efficiency gains accrue to leaders, 
whereas workers’ earnings are not very different between NoLeader and Leader treatments. 
Indeed, for leaders there is a statistically significant difference between earnings in NoLeader 
and Leader treatments (Mann-Whitney tests: NoLeader_Homogeneous vs. 
                                                          
13 We do not detect statistically significant differences in efficiency between our Homogeneous and 
Heterogeneous treatments (Mann-Whitney tests: NoLeader_Homogeneous vs. NoLeader_Heterogeneous p = 
0.975; Leader_Homogeneousvs. Leader_Heterogeneous p = 0.460). 
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Leader_Homogeneous p < 0.001; NoLeader_Heterogeneous vs. Leader_Heterogeneous p 
< 0.001), while for workers earnings in the Leader treatment are not significantly different 
from earnings in the NoLeader treatment (Mann-Whitney tests: NoLeader_Homogeneous 
vs. Leader_Homogeneous p = 0.106; NoLeader_Heterogeneous vs. 
Leader_Heterogeneous low productivity p = 0.974; high productivity p = 0.577). 
3. Study 2: The emergence of endogenous leadership 
Our initial study raises a natural question about whether leadership will emerge in 
environments where leaders are not exogenously imposed on a team, but are endogenously 
appointed by team members. In such environments, the success of leadership may be 
hindered: team members may refuse to support leadership if leaders behave too 
opportunistically and do not share enough of the proceeds of team production. On the other 
hand, the endogenous appointment of leaders may constrain their opportunism and thus 
facilitate the emergence of successful leadership. Our follow-up study addresses these 
questions by studying a setting where leadership is not imposed on teams, but instead may 
emerge endogenously through the support of team members.  
3.1 Experiment design and procedures 
The follow-up study is based on the same ten-round, five-person team production game that 
we used in our initial study and that we described above. However, differently from the initial 
study, at the beginning of the game the four workers simultaneously express a preference for 
the leader's reward power, i.e. the share 𝛾 of team output that will be redistributed by the 
leader. Workers can choose between one of six possible levels of 𝛾: 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1, 
one of which will be implemented across all ten rounds. For example, with 𝛾 = 0.4, in each 
round 40% of team output is transferred to the leader, whereas 60% of team output is evenly 
distributed among workers. Note that when leaders are granted no reward power (𝛾 = 0) or 
full reward power (𝛾 =1) we have cases that correspond to the NoLeader and Leader 
treatments of the initial study. The level of 𝛾 implemented in a team is decided using a 
"random dictator" rule: after each worker has expressed his/her preference, one worker from 
each team is selected at random and his/her choice of 𝛾 is implemented.14  
                                                          
14 We implemented a random dictator rule because we are interested in team members’ preferences for 
leadership. The random dictator rule is the simplest mechanism that gives workers an incentive to reveal their 
most preferred level of reward power. While the use of alternative voting rules, such as a majority rule, may 
increase the legitimacy of the voting outcome, this would also introduce strategic considerations in voting 
decisions that would confound the identification of workers’ preferences for leadership.  
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We study a repeated version of this game across three blocks of 10 rounds each. 
Subjects were informed of this structure at the beginning of the experiment. Group 
composition and roles were kept fixed across blocks and rounds. At the beginning of each 
block, all team members were notified of the randomly selected level of 𝛾 and knew that it 
would apply to the subsequent 10 rounds of the block. Note that this introduces an incentive 
for leaders not to abuse their power in the early blocks in order to increase the probability of 
being granted power in later bocks, and this may represent an effective mechanism for 
constraining the opportunism of leaders. As in the initial study, we conduct a Homogeneous 
treatment where all workers have the same productivity (𝜃𝑖 = 60) and a Heterogeneous 
treatment where two workers have high productivity (𝜃𝑖 = 80) and two have low 
productivity (𝜃𝑖 = 40). 
The experiments were carried out at [OMITTED FOR PEER REVIEW] using the same 
procedures as in the initial study. We had 195 subjects in total, 100 in the Homogeneous 
treatment (20 teams) and 95 in the Heterogeneous treatment (19 teams). Subjects were paid 
according to their accumulated earnings across the 30 rounds of the experiment at a rate of 
£0.10 per 100 points. Earnings ranged between £12.23 and £24.89, averaging £16.04, 
including a £3.50 show-up free. On average session lasted about 150 minutes.  
3.2 Results 
Figure 3 shows the reward power that workers are willing to delegate to leaders in each of the 
three blocks of the experiment in the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous treatments. The 
figure is based on the levels of 𝛾 submitted by all workers at the beginning of each block, and 
not only on those that were actually implemented in the experiment.  
Initially, delegation of reward power is similar across our two treatments: in block 1 of 
both treatments workers are willing to delegate about one-third of team output to leaders, 
29% in Homogeneous and 33% in Heterogeneous. In the Homogeneous treatment the share 
of team output delegated to leaders increases to 42% in block 2 and 45% in block 3. In 
contrast, in Heterogeneous workers delegate less in blocks 2 and 3 than in block 1: 26% in 
block 2 and 29% in block 3. The difference between treatments in block 1 is not significant 
(Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.422), whereas the differences in block 2 and 3 are (Mann-Whitney 
tests: block 2 p = 0.034; block 3 p = 0.026).15 
                                                          
15 The test for block 1 is based on 80 individual observations in Homogeneous and 76 individual observations in 
Heterogeneous. The other tests use team averages as the independent unit of observation and are therefore based 
on 20 (Homogeneous) and 19 (Heterogeneous) observations per treatment.  
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Figure 3 – Average reward power delegated by workers 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of delegation choices across the three blocks of the 
experiment in the Homogeneous (left panel) and Heterogeneous (right panel) treatments. 
Figure 4 – Distribution of delegation choices in Homogeneous (left panel) and 
Heterogeneous (right panel)  
  
In both treatments, and in all blocks, the modal worker delegates no power to the 
leader. In the Homogeneous treatment the proportion of workers who are opposed to 
delegation is stable across blocks and varies between 34% and 39%. In Heterogeneous this 
proportion is more volatile across blocks: in block 1 29% of workers are opposed to 
delegation, and this proportion increases to 49% in block 2 and 47% in block 3. The fraction 
of workers in favor of delegation also varies across blocks. In both treatments, workers are 
initially cautious in delegating reward power: the most popular choices in favor of delegation 
in block 1 are for a reward power of 0.2 or 0.4. In later blocks workers tend to delegate more 
power to the leader, especially in the Homogeneous treatment where the fraction of workers 
in favor of full delegation (𝛾 =1) increases from 5% in block 1 to 25% in block 3.  
Overall, these results show that workers delegate some power to leaders, but they do 
not fully exploit the potential for delegation. In both treatments, and in all blocks, workers 
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transfer less than half of team output to the leader. Moreover, a substantial fraction of team 
members (between one-third and one-half) are opposed to any transfer of power to the leader. 
This reluctance to delegate power to the leader is not due to the fact that endogenous 
leaders are unable to provide appropriate incentives for team members to supply effort. In 
fact, in Appendix C we show that effort and efficiency are considerably higher in teams with 
than without leaders. Moreover, as in our initial study, the positive effect of leadership on 
effort is driven by the redistribution strategies adopted by leaders, which reward workers who 
supply effort and withhold rewards from those who shirk (see Appendix C). However, also as 
in our initial study, leaders tend to appropriate large fractions of the proceeds from team 
production (about 20% of the team output in Homogeneous, and about 30% in 
Heterogeneous, see Appendix C, Figure C.3). As in Study 1, this leaves workers no better off 
with than without a leader and generates strong asymmetries between leaders' and workers' 
earnings (see Appendix C, Tables C.2 and C.3).  
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Our studies investigate a team production game that exhibits the fundamental incentive 
problems facing teams when agents are purely self-interested. When the benefits of team 
production are distributed using group incentive schemes, such as the simple revenue-sharing 
scheme we employ, there are well-known free-riding incentives. We observe substantial 
levels of shirking under simple revenue-sharing. When a leader can allocate the benefits, the 
leader can incentivize workers by allocating benefits to those who contribute the most and 
withholding them from those who free-ride. However, in theory this hierarchical solution to 
the free-rider problem introduces further incentive problems. In particular, a self-interested 
leader has an incentive to keep all the benefits for herself. Indeed, this is identified by Miller 
(1992, p. 154) as the central dilemma in a hierarchy: “how to constrain the self-interest of 
those with a stake in the inevitable residual generated by an efficient incentive system”.  
Our research suggests that self-restraint by leaders can resolve this dilemma. We find 
that leaders do reward those who contribute to team output, and do so in a way that 
incentivizes efficient effort provision. To this extent, our research suggests that hierarchical 
institutional structures can resolve free-rider problems in teams. However, our research also 
identifies another problem. Leaders who calibrate rewards so as to maximize their residual 
claim while giving away just enough to incentivize work will tend to distribute the benefits of 
leadership unevenly. Workers are (just) compensated for their efforts, and the majority of the 
rents accrue to the leader. Given this, workers are barely better off in a well-functioning, 
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hard-working team than in a dysfunctional team of shirkers. This asymmetric distribution of 
the leadership rents limits the benefits that workers get from a hierarchical structure. Thus we 
find that when the leader’s reward power requires the acquiescence of workers, workers are 
less willing to empower the leader. Thus, endogenously arriving at an efficient incentive 
scheme is a more difficult challenge. 
It is interesting to relate our findings to the existing experimental literatures on the 
effectiveness of leadership in solving the free-rider problem. Our results on the effectiveness 
of leadership are in line with the findings of the few experimental studies in economics that 
have focused on central leaders who have the power to allocate group resources. Heijden et 
al. (2009) and Stoddard et al. (2014), for example, compare settings where group output is 
shared equally among group members to settings where group output is distributed by a 
group leader who has the power to monitor other group members’ efforts. Both studies differ 
in numerous ways from ours: for example, in Heijden et al. (2009) leaders have a productive 
as well as allocative role, effort decisions are binary, and there are complementarities in team 
production; in Stoddard et al. (2014) subjects play a common-property resource game, leaders 
can only choose between a limited and exogenously determined set of allocation rules, and 
they cannot misappropriate team output. Moreover, neither of these studies considers 
asymmetries in productivity or endogenous incentive mechanisms. Despite the several 
differences between designs, these studies, like us, find that the introduction of a leader 
strongly and significantly increases cooperation within the group and improves efficiency.16 
Also related is the paper by Abeler et al. (2010), who study a principal-agent setting where 
the principal can distribute wages to the agents after having observed their efforts. They find 
that allowing principals to pay different wages to the agents has a beneficial effect on effort 
relative to a setting where principals are forced to pay equal wages, suggesting that the power 
to discretionally distribute resources is an important feature of successful leadership.17 
We show that these positive effects of leadership on cooperation are present in settings 
where leaders manage heterogeneous as well as homogeneous teams. In fact, we do not 
observe any significant differences in team production between homogeneous and 
                                                          
16 Also related is Grosse et al. (2011), who study the role of central agents in investing in the monitoring of 
workers’ effort in a team production experiment. They compare teams with central monitors with teams with 
peer monitoring as well as teams without monitoring possibilities. They then let workers choose their preferred 
monitoring system (if any). They find that teams are very successful at self-monitoring and thus often opt for 
peer monitoring systems. However, when peer monitoring is comparatively more costly than central monitoring, 
peer monitoring become ineffective, and workers tend to choose central monitoring. 
17 See also Bartling and von Siemens (2011), who find that wage inequality has no detrimental effect on effort 
provision in a team production setting. 
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heterogeneous teams in our experiment, nor do we observe differences in the efforts of high 
and low productivity workers in heterogeneous teams. 
The fact that we do not find differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
teams when there is no leader is not necessarily surprising given that there is mixed evidence 
about the impact of heterogeneity in VCM settings (see the summary of the literature in 
Reuben and Riedl, 2013). The studies most related to ours are Tan (2008) and Kölle (2015), 
who also study heterogeneity in productivities. Tan (2008) finds homogeneous groups 
contribute more than heterogeneous groups, whereas Kölle (2015) finds the opposite.  
Previous experiments have not studied the effect of heterogeneity on team performance 
when leaders have reward power. However, heterogeneity has been found to undermine the 
effectiveness of “leading-by-example” in public good games.18 Levati et al. (2007) show that 
when group members have different endowments and are aware of the distribution of 
endowments, leadership is still beneficial relative to a setting without a leader, but not as 
effective as in the case of equal endowments. When group members are not aware of the 
distribution of endowments in the group, this small positive effect vanishes and contributions 
are not different than in the absence of a leader. Levati et al. (2007) argue that the 
ineffectiveness of leadership in heterogeneous groups stems from the inability of leaders to 
send a signal about the appropriate contribution levels when there is incomplete information 
about the distribution of endowments. This could explain the differences between their 
findings and ours: in our setting, the nature and extent of heterogeneity is common 
knowledge among team members and thus the leaders can use rewarding strategies to send 
clear messages about appropriate contributions.  
While our results suggest that central leaders can successfully promote pro-social 
behavior and cooperation, Nosenzo and Sefton (2014) show that centralized leadership may 
not always be successful. They study voluntary contribution games where leaders can assign 
rewards or punishments to the other team members after having observed their contributions. 
They find that reward/punishment power does not increase contributions relative to a setting 
where no rewards or punishments are possible.19 Nosenzo and Sefton note that one of the 
                                                          
18 In these games contributions to a public good are made sequentially so that the contributions made by leaders 
may, in principle, influence those made by followers (see, e.g.,  Gächter and Renner, 2003; Güth et al., 2007; 
Potters et al., 2007; Drouvelis and Nosenzo, 2013; Pogrebna et al., 2011; Haigner and Wakolbinger, 2010; Rivas 
and Sutter, 2011). See also van Vugt and De Cremer (1999), van Vugt and De Cremer (2003), and van Vugt et 
al. (2004) for a social psychology perspective on leadership and leading-by-example in social dilemma games. 
19 Gürerk et al. (2015) report similar findings in a 20-round 4-person public goods game. They find that 
contributions are somewhat higher in treatments with leaders with reward/punishment power than in a treatment 
without reward/punishment possibilities. However, they also show that this effect is driven by the 
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reasons that could explain the failure of leadership in their study is the existence of 
heterogeneity in the quality of leaders in their experiment. While some leaders used effective 
reward or punishment strategies to encourage cooperation, other leaders used punishments or 
rewards ineffectively, or did not try to use them at all and kept for themselves the resources 
that were earmarked for punishing or rewarding team members.20 Thus, opportunism and, 
more generally, differences in the quality of leaders can hinder the potential for leadership to 
overcome the free-rider problem.  
These issues are also present in our study, as leaders in our experiments also face 
opportunistic incentives to appropriate all the team output for themselves rather than to 
redistribute it and encourage team production. While our leaders seem to be able to eschew 
the temptation to seize all team resources for themselves and dispense enough rewards to 
repay workers for their efforts, they still take the lion’s share of team output. As a 
consequence, and despite the large differences in team production, workers are not better off 
with than without a leader. This constitutes a significant impediment to the success of 
leadership in our setting since, as our second study shows, workers are reluctant to delegate 
power to the leader and thus the benefits of leadership are only partly realized.  
These findings are in line with previous studies of leadership and delegation of agency. 
For example, Hamman et al. (2011) study a linear public goods production setting where 
contributions are either selected individually by group members, or by a designed “allocator” 
who is granted complete authority over the choice of contributions of all group members. 
They find that delegating authority to a central allocator has a strong, positive effect on public 
good provision. However, in a second study Hamman et al. (2011) allow each group member 
to choose whether or not to cede agency to the central allocator. Similar to our study, they 
find that groups fail to seize the benefits of leadership as not enough group members are 
willing to transfer their agency to the central allocator.  
Overall, these findings point to a potential problem with hierarchical solutions to the 
free-rider problem. Leaders face strong incentives to behave opportunistically and abuse their 
power. Even when leaders manage to eschew the temptation of opportunism, the fear of 
exploitation may induce followers to resist delegation of agency to central authorities.   
                                                          
reward/punishment incentives rather than by leadership per se: contributions in the leader treatments are in fact 
not different from those in two additional treatments with peer-to-peer rewards and punishment. 
20 This finding is also emphasized by Heijden et al. (2009), who also observe a mixture of “good” and “bad” 
leaders in their setting. Similarly, Brandts and Cooper (2007) examine the role of leadership in a turnaround 
game and show that while leaders are on average effective in increasing coordination in groups, not all leaders 
are equally effective and a third of groups experience complete coordination failure in the final rounds of the 
experiment.  
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Online Supplementary Materials 
 
Online Appendix A: Instructions 
 
[All treatments: Preliminary Instructions  
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is 
run by the [OMITTED FOR PEER REVIEW] and has been financed by various research 
foundations. Just for showing up you have already earned £3.50. You can earn additional 
money depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is therefore very 
important that you read these instructions with care. 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of these rules. 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you will 
have time to ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any choices you make in 
this experiment are entirely anonymous. Please do not touch the computer or its mouse until 
you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
] 
[Exogenous treatments: Instructions 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be matched with four other people, randomly 
selected from the participants in this room, to form a group of five. The composition of your 
group will stay the same throughout the experiment, i.e. you will form a group with the 
same four other participants during the whole experiment.  
Each person in the group will be randomly assigned a role, either ‘group member A’, ‘group 
member B’, ‘group member C’, ‘group member D’, or ‘group member E’. Your role will 
stay the same throughout the experiment. You will not learn the identity of the other 
participants in your group. Participants will be identified simply as ‘group member A’, 
‘group member B’ etc..  
When we have finished reading the instructions you will be informed of your role. The 
experiment will then consist of 10 periods. In each period you can earn points. Your point 
earnings will depend on the decisions made within your group, and will not be affected by 
decisions made in other groups.  
At the end of the experiment your accumulated point earnings from all periods will be 
converted into cash at the exchange rate of 10 pence per 100 points. You will be paid, in 
cash and in private, this amount in addition to the show-up fee of £3.50. 
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Decisions and Earnings 
The experiment consists of ten periods in which you can earn points. Every period has the 
same structure and has two stages. 
Stage One 
At the beginning of Stage One each group member will be given 10 tokens.  
Group members A, B, C and D must choose how many of these tokens to invest in a group 
project and how many to keep in their private accounts. Group member E has no choice to 
make: the computer will place all ten of his or her tokens in his or her private account. 
Each token a group member keeps in his or her private account yields a return of thirty points 
to that group member.  
[Homogeneous: Each token a group member invests in the group project yields a return of 
sixty points to the group. How these points are allocated among group members will be 
determined in Stage Two.] 
[Heterogeneous: Each token group member A or B invests in the group project yields a 
return of forty points to the group. Each token group member C or D invests in the group 
project yields a return of eighty points to the group. How these points are allocated among 
group members will be determined in Stage Two.] 
Your point earnings for the period will be your point earnings from your private account plus 
your point earnings from the group project. 
If you are one of group members A, B, C or D, you will make your decision by entering the 
number of tokens you invest in the group project. Any tokens you do not invest will 
automatically be kept in your private account. You will enter your decisions on a screen like 
the one shown below. 
[Homogeneous: 
  
] 
 
27 
 
[Heterogeneous: 
 
] 
When you have made your decision you must click on the SUBMIT button. Once group 
members A, B, C and D have submitted their decisions Stage Two will begin. 
Stage Two 
[Homogeneous: Remember, each token invested in the group project generates a return of 
sixty points to the group. Thus, the total return from the group project will be 60 times the 
total number of tokens invested in the group project. How this return is distributed among 
group members is determined as follows.] 
[Heterogeneous: Remember, each token invested in the group project by group member A or 
B yields a return of forty points to the group. Each token invested in the group project by 
group member C or D yields a return of eighty points to the group. How this return is 
distributed among group members is determined as follows.] 
[NoLeader_Homogeneous: Each of group members A, B, C, and D will receive an equal 
share of the total return from the group project. This means that each group member receives 
60 / 4 = 15 points per token for each token invested in the group project. 
Thus, if you are group member A, B, C or D, your earnings for the period will be: 
Your point earnings = 30 x (number of tokens kept in your private account) + 15 
x (total number of tokens invested in the group project by your group).] 
[Control_Homogeneous: All group members (A, B, C, D and E) will receive an equal share 
of the total return from the group project. This means that each group member receives 60 / 5 
= 12 points per token for each token invested in the group project. 
Thus, your earnings for the period will be: 
Your point earnings = 30 x (number of tokens kept in your private account) + 12 
x (total number of tokens invested in the group project by your group).] 
[Control_Heterogeneous: Each of group members A, B, C, and D will receive an equal 
share of the total return from the group project. This means that for each token invested in the 
group project by A or B each group member receives 40 / 4 = 10 points per token, and for 
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each token invested in the group project by C or D each group member receives 80 / 4 = 20 
points per token. 
Thus, if you are group member A, B, C or D, your earnings for the period will be: 
Your point earnings = 30 x (number of tokens kept in your private account) + 
10 x (total number of tokens invested in the group project by A and B) +  
20 x (total number of tokens invested in the group project by C and D).] 
[NoLeader Heterogeneous Additional: All group members (A, B, C, D and E) will receive 
an equal share of the total return from the group project. This means that for each token 
invested in the group project by A or B each group member receives 40 / 5 = 8 points per 
token, and for each token invested in the group project by C or D each group member 
receives 80 / 5 = 16 points per token. 
Thus, your earnings for the period will be: 
Your point earnings = 30 x (number of tokens kept in your private account) + 
8 x (total number of tokens invested in the group project by A and B) +  
16 x (total number of tokens invested in the group project by C and D).] 
[NoLeader: If you are group member E you do not get any of the return from the group 
project. Thus, if you are group member E your earnings for the period will be 
Your point earnings = 30 x 10 = 300.] 
[ Leader: Group member E will be informed of the decisions of the other group members 
and must decide how to allocate the total return from the group account among all group 
members, including himself or herself. Group member E is free to choose any allocation he 
or she wants, as long as each group member receives at least zero points from the group 
project and the total received by all group members is equal to the total return from the group 
project. 
To do this Group Member E will complete a screen like the one shown below. 
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The first column shows the group member ID and the second column shows how many 
tokens this group member invested in the group project in Stage One. The third column 
shows the resulting return to the group from this investment decision. We will explain the 
fourth column in a moment. The fifth column is to be completed by group member E and 
shows how many points from the group project that this group member receives. The sixth 
column shows this group member’s point earnings from his or her private account and the 
last column shows this group member’s point earnings for the period. 
Group member E completes the fifth column by allocating the total return from the group 
project. The total return is shown above the table in bold, and the amount that still has to be 
allocated is shown at the top of the fourth column. In each row of the fourth column there are 
add (+) / subtract (-) buttons that group member E can use to allocate the total return. For 
example, if group member E clicks on the first add button 100 points will be added to group 
member A’s point earnings from the group project. At the same time the entry in the final 
column for group member A will increase by 100 points and the amount still to be allocated 
will be reduced by 100 points. Thus, Group member E can easily see how total earnings and 
the amount left to be allocated change as he or she allocates the return. Group member E 
must allocate the total return from the group project among the five group members. Once 
group member E has allocated the total return he or she can either amend her decisions using 
the add/subtract buttons, or submit the decision by clicking the SUBMIT button.  
] 
At the end of the period all group members will be shown a Decision and Earnings screen 
like the one shown below. 
 
The screen shows all decisions and earnings for all group members for the period. At the 
bottom of the screen you will also see your total point earnings that you have accumulated 
from this and previous periods. 
After you have read the information on the Decisions and Earnings screen you can click the 
OK button to continue. Once all group members have done this, the next period will begin.  
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At the end of period ten you will see your total point earnings from all periods and you will 
be paid 10p for every 100 points, in addition to your £3.50 show-up fee. You will be paid in 
private and in cash. 
Questions 
Please answer the questions below. The example in the questions is purely hypothetical. In 
the actual experiment the investments in the group project [Leader: and the allocation of the 
total return] will be determined by the decisions made in your group. In a couple of minutes 
someone will come to your desk to check your answers. When each participant has answered 
all questions correctly we will continue with the experiment. 
1. How many periods will there be?       __________ 
2. Will the people in your group be the same for period to period or 
 change from period to period?        Same / change 
 
Suppose that in a period A invests 0, B invests 4 tokens, C invests 6 and D invests 10 tokens 
in the group project.  
3. What will be the total return from the group project in that period?  __________ 
[NoLeader: 
4. How many points will each group member earn from the  
group project in that period?        A: _________ 
B: _________ 
C: _________ 
D: _________ 
E: _________ 
5. How many points will each group member earn from his or her 
private account in that period?       A: _________ 
B: _________ 
C: _________ 
D: _________ 
E: _________ 
 
6. What will be each group member’s point earnings for the period?  A: _________ 
B: _________ 
C: _________ 
D: _________ 
E: _________ 
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] 
[Leader: 
4. Suppose E distributes the total return from the group project as shown in the Table below. 
Complete the blanks in the last two columns.  
Group 
member 
Stage ONE 
investment in 
group project 
Return to 
group project 
Points from 
group project 
Points from 
private 
account 
Total point 
earnings 
A 4 240 [160] 300   
B 6 360 [240] 100   
C 10 600 [800] 240   
D 0 0 360   
E - - 200   
] 
[Endogenous: Instructions 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be matched with four other people, randomly 
selected from the participants in this room, to form a group of five. The composition of your 
group will stay the same throughout the experiment, i.e. you will form a group with the 
same four other participants during the whole experiment.  
Each person in the group will be randomly assigned a role, either ‘group member A’, ‘group 
member B’, ‘group member C’, ‘group member D’, or ‘group member E’. Your role will 
stay the same throughout the experiment. You will not learn the identity of the other 
participants in your group. Participants will be identified simply as ‘group member A’, 
‘group member B’ etc..  
When we have finished reading the instructions you will be informed of your role. The 
experiment will then consist of 3 blocks of 10 periods each. In each period you can earn 
points. Your point earnings will depend on the decisions made within your group, and will 
not be affected by decisions made in other groups.  
At the end of the experiment your accumulated point earnings from all periods will be 
converted into cash at the exchange rate of 10 pence per 100 points. You will be paid, in 
cash and in private, this amount in addition to the show-up fee of £3.50. 
Decisions and Earnings 
The experiment consists of three blocks of ten periods in which you can earn points. Every 
period has the same structure and has two stages. 
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Stage One 
At the beginning of Stage One each group member will be given 10 tokens.  
Group members A, B, C and D must choose how many of these tokens to invest in a group 
project and how many to keep in their private accounts. Group member E has no choice to 
make: the computer will place all ten of his or her tokens in his or her private account. 
Each token a group member keeps in his or her private account yields a return of thirty points 
to that group member.  
[Homogeneous: Each token a group member invests in the group project yields a return of 
sixty points to the group. How these points are allocated among group members will be 
determined in Stage Two.] 
[Heterogeneous: Each token group member A or B invests in the group project yields a 
return of forty points to the group. Each token group member C or D invests in the group 
project yields a return of eighty points to the group. How these points are allocated among 
group members will be determined in Stage Two.] 
Your point earnings for the period will be your point earnings from your private account plus 
your point earnings from the group project. 
If you are one of group members A, B, C or D, you will make your decision by entering the 
number of tokens you invest in the group project. Any tokens you do not invest will 
automatically be kept in your private account. You will enter your decisions on a screen like 
the one shown below. 
[Homogeneous: 
 
] 
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[Heterogeneous: 
 
] 
When you have made your decision you must click on the SUBMIT button. Once group 
members A, B, C and D have submitted their decisions Stage Two will begin. 
Stage Two 
[Homogeneous: Remember, each token invested in the group project generates a return of 
sixty points to the group. How this return is distributed among group members is determined 
as follows.] 
[Heterogeneous: Remember, each token group member A or B invests in the group project 
yields a return of forty points to the group. Each token group member C or D invests in the 
group project yields a return of eighty points to the group. How this return is distributed 
among group members is determined as follows.] 
The total return will be divided into two parts: 
total return = automatic return + discretionary return. 
The automatic return will be equally distributed among group members A, B, C and D. The 
discretionary return will be allocated by group member E. We will explain what part of the 
total return will be automatic and what part will be discretionary later. 
For the discretionary part, group member E will be informed of the decisions of the other 
group members and must decide how to allocate the discretionary return among all group 
members, including himself or herself. Group member E is free to choose any allocation he 
or she wants, as long as each group member receives at least zero discretionary points from 
the group project and the total discretionary points received by all group members equals the 
discretionary return. 
To do this group member E will complete a screen like the one shown below. 
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The first column shows the group member ID and the second column shows how many 
tokens this group member invested in the group project in Stage One. The third column 
shows the resulting return to the group from this investment decision. We will explain the 
fourth column in a moment. The fifth column is to be completed by group member E and 
shows how many points from the group project that this group member receives. Note that in 
each row of this column there are two numbers, the first is the earnings from the group 
project this group member automatically receives, and the second is the discretionary 
earnings from the group project that this group member is allocated by group member E. The 
sixth column shows this group member’s point earnings from his or her private account and 
the last column shows this group member’s point earnings for the period. 
Group member E completes the fifth column by allocating the discretionary return from the 
group project. The total return from the group project is shown above the table in bold, and 
the discretionary return that group member E must allocate is shown on the next line. The 
amount that still has to be allocated by group member E is shown at the top of the fourth 
column. In each row of the fourth column there are add (+) / subtract (-) buttons that group 
member E can use to allocate the return. For example, if group member E clicks on the first 
add button 100 points will be added to group member A’s point earnings from the group 
project. At the same time the entry in the final column for group member A will increase by 
100 points and the amount still to be allocated will be reduced by 100 points. Thus, group 
member E can easily see how total earnings and the amount left to be allocated change as he 
or she allocates the return. Group member E must allocate all of the discretionary return 
among the five group members. Once group member E has allocated all of the discretionary 
return he or she can either amend his or her decisions using the add/subtract buttons, or 
submit the decision by clicking the SUBMIT button.  
 
At the end of the period all group members will be shown a Decision and Earnings screen 
like the one shown below. 
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The screen shows all decisions and earnings for all group members for the period. At the 
bottom of the screen you will also see your total point earnings that you have accumulated 
from this and previous periods. 
After you have read the information on the Decisions and Earnings screen you can click the 
OK button to continue. Once all group members have done this, the next period will begin.  
Beginning a Block 
At the beginning of a block (that is, just before periods 1, 11 and 21), each of group members 
A, B, C and D will see the following screen. 
 
 
Each group member has to indicate how he or she wants the total return from the group 
project to be divided between the discretionary return and automatic return. Each group 
member has to choose a percentage (out of 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100%). This is the 
percentage of the total return from the group project that he or she wants to be the 
discretionary return, that is, the percentage to be allocated by group member E. The 
remaining percentage is the percentage of the total return from the group project that this 
group member wants to be distributed automatically.  
After group members A, B, C and D have submitted their decisions, one of the four decisions 
will be selected at random by the computer and will be used to determine how the total return 
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is distributed during the block of ten periods. The randomly selected group member’s 
decision will be used for all ten periods in the block. All group members will be notified of 
the randomly selected decision on a screen like the one shown below. 
 
Notice that if the discretionary return is 0% of the total return from the group project then 
group member E will have no decision to make. In this case group member E will still see the 
stage two decision screen, but he or she cannot change the entries in the table and he or she 
should just click on the SUBMIT button. 
Ending the Experiment 
At the end of period thirty you will see your total point earnings from all periods and you will 
be paid 10p for every 100 points, in addition to your £3.50 show-up fee. You will be paid in 
private and in cash. 
37 
 
Questions 
Please answer the questions below. The example in the questions is purely hypothetical. In 
the actual experiment the investments in the group project and the allocation of the total 
return will be determined by the decisions made in your group. In a couple of minutes 
someone will come to your desk to check your answers. When each participant has answered 
all questions correctly we will continue with the experiment. 
1. How many blocks will there be there be in this experiment?   __________ 
2. How many periods will there be there be in each block?    __________ 
3. Will the people in your group be the same from block to block or 
 change from block to block?       Same / change 
4. Will the people in your group be the same from period to period or 
 change from period to period?      Same / change 
5. Suppose that just before period 21 group member A chose the  
discretionary return 0%, B chose 20%, C chose 80%, and D chose  
100%. Group member C’s choice was randomly selected by the  
computer. What percentage of total return from the group project  
will be allocated by group member E in periods 21 to 30?   __________ 
Suppose that for this block of periods the discretionary return is 0% and the automatic return 
is 100% of the total return from the group project. Suppose also that in a period A invests 4, 
B invests 6 tokens, C invests 10 and D invests 0 tokens in the group project.  
6. What will be the return to the group project from  
each group member’s investment in that period?    A: _________  
B: _________ 
C: _________ 
D: _________ 
E: _________ 
7. What will be the total return from the group project in that period?     _________ 
8. How many points will each group member earn from the group 
project in that period?        A: _________ 
B: _________ 
C: _________ 
D: _________ 
E: _________ 
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9. How many points will each group member earn from his or her 
private account in that period?       A: _________ 
B: _________ 
C: _________ 
D: _________ 
E: _________ 
10. What will be each group member’s point earnings for the period?  A: _________ 
B: _________ 
C: _________ 
D: _________ 
E: _________ 
 
Suppose that for this block of periods the discretionary return is 100% and the automatic 
return is 0% of the total return from the group project. Suppose also that in a period A invests 
4, B invests 6 tokens, C invests 10 and D invests 0 tokens in the group project.  
11. Suppose E allocates the total return from the group project as shown in the Table below. 
Complete the blanks in the last two columns. 
Group 
member 
Stage ONE 
investment in 
group project 
Return to 
group project 
Points from 
group project 
Points from 
private 
account 
Total point 
earnings 
A 4 240 [160] 300   
B 6 360 [240] 100   
C 10 600 [800] 240   
D 0 0 360   
E - - 200   
]  
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Online Appendix B: Additional treatments 
 
Figure B.1 Effort choice in control and NoLeader treatments across rounds 
 
 
 
Table B.1 Summary statistics of efforts in the Control treatments and non-parametric 
comparisons with NoLeader treatments. 
 Homogeneous Heterogeneous 
 NoLeader Control p-value NoLeader Control p-value 
Effort (round 1) 51.25 26.67 0.002    
Low Productivity    48.12 41.43 0.623 
High Productivity    48.64 31.43 0.102 
Effort (all rounds) 30.21 12.08 0.007    
Low Productivity    27.86 11.57 0.021 
High Productivity    33.73 12.93 0.007 
Effort measured as a percentage of maximum. P-values based on Mann-Whitney two-sided tests.  
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Online Appendix C. Additional Analysis for Study 2 
 
In this Appendix we report additional analysis of effort and redistribution behavior in 
Study 2. Starting with effort choices, Figures C.1 and C.2 report the average effort supplied 
in each of the three blocks of the Homogeneous (Figure C.1) and Heterogeneous (Figure C.2) 
treatments, disaggregated by the realized level of the leader's reward power.  
Teams with powerful leaders supply considerably more effort than teams with 
powerless leaders. The separation between teams with powerful and powerless leaders is 
clearest in the Homogeneous treatment (Figure C.1), where the effort trajectories are 
generally higher the higher the share of team output allocated by the leader. There is a similar 
pattern in the Heterogeneous treatment (Figure C.2), although there are some anomalies (e.g. 
the low effort in teams with 𝛾 = 1 in Block 2); these anomalies may well reflect the low 
numbers of observations in some cases (the number of teams that have delegated a level of 
reward power is shown in the legend of each panel).  
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Figure C.1 – Average effort in Homogeneous 
 
 
Figure C.2 – Average effort in Heterogeneous 
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We explore the effect of leader power on effort in Table C.1, where we report fixed-
effects regressions of effort on dummy variables for the level of reward power delegated to 
the leader (note that the benchmark category is the case where 𝛾 = 0, i.e. the team has no 
leader). We report separate regressions for the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous treatments. 
For the Heterogeneous treatment, we report separate regressions for low and high 
productivity workers. All regressions also include round and block variables as well as a 
dummy variable assuming value 1 for observations in the last round of each block. 1 
Table C.1 – Determinants of workers’ effort 
 
Homogeneous 
treatment 
Heterogeneous treatment 
 Low Productivity 
Workers 
High Productivity 
Workers 
0.2 
6.37 
(6.89) 
0.77 
(6.96) 
3.63 
(7.35) 
0.4 
-13.52 
(10.70) 
14.16 
(13.23) 
12.71 
(9.90) 
0.6 
31.60*** 
(5.54) 
12.71 
(13.67) 
17.29** 
(7.88) 
0.8 
52.97*** 
(7.18) 
12.89 
(11.75) 
21.17** 
(9.51) 
1 
55.50*** 
(9.05) 
38.53*** 
(11.58) 
32.73*** 
(9.26) 
Round 
-1.09** 
(0.51) 
-1.57*** 
(0.54) 
-1.74*** 
(0.57) 
Last Round Dummy 
-9.72*** 
(2.56) 
-0.99 
(2.45) 
-0.00 
(2.91) 
Block 
0.95 
(3.31) 
-2.42 
(2.53) 
-2.69 
(2.58) 
Constant 
44.13*** 
(10.08) 
39.35*** 
(8.06) 
48.29*** 
(7.97) 
N. of observations 
R2 
2400 
.318 
1140 
.190 
1140 
.136 
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the team level 
reported in parentheses (20 clusters in Homogeneous; 19 clusters in Heterogeneous). 
Dependent variable is workers’ effort expressed as percentage of maximum possible effort. 
Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.      
The regressions confirm that delegation of reward power increases effort provision. The 
effect is particularly strong in Homogeneous where delegating full reward power to leaders 
(𝛾 = 1) increases productivity by about 55 percentage points relative to teams without a 
leader. In Heterogeneous the effect of delegation is somewhat weaker: for low productivity 
workers the effect is only statistically significant when the team delegates full power to 
leaders; for high productivity workers the effect is statistically significant when 60% or more 
of the team output is delegated to the leader. 
                                                          
1 Using random effects regressions with controls for individual characteristics (gender, risk attitude, field of 
study) produces very similar results.  
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The positive effect of leadership on effort is driven by the redistribution strategies 
adopted by leaders, which reward workers who supply effort and withhold rewards from 
those who shirk. Figure C.3 shows the average share of team output received by leaders and 
workers disaggregated by level of reward power of the leader. The left panel contains data 
from the Homogeneous treatment whereas the right panel contains data from the 
Heterogeneous treatment.2 Workers' output shares are disaggregated based on how their 
efforts relate to the average effort of the rest of their team.  
Figure C.3 – Share of team output received 
   
Notes: When 𝛾 = 0 the leader is assigned no share of the team output and all output is redistributed in equal 
proportions among workers. When 𝛾 > 0 the figure shows how the share of team output assigned to the leader 
is redistributed among workers and leaders.  
In both treatments, when the leader has no reward power (𝛾 = 0) each worker 
automatically receives a quarter of the team output and the leader receives nothing. When 
leaders are granted some reward power (𝛾 > 0), leaders redistribute output by giving higher 
rewards to those who supply more effort. In the Homogeneous treatment workers who supply 
effort at or above the average effort in their team receive on average 25% of the team output 
assigned to the leader. In contrast, those who provide less effort than the team average 
receive only 7% of team output. The difference is highly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p < 0.001). 3Similar patterns emerge in the Heterogeneous treatment: workers supplying 
effort at or above the team average receive 23% of team output, whereas workers supplying 
effort below the team average receive 5% of team output (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 
0.001). This is true both in the case of leaders who have been allocated full reward power, i.e. 
                                                          
2 For simplicity, in Figure C.3 we do not distinguish between high and low productivity workers. We do not 
observe substantial differences in rewards received by high and low productivity workers, although workers 
who contribute 5 or more units of effort in excess of team average tend to receive higher rewards if they are high 
rather than low productivity workers.  
3 This and subsequent non-parametric tests use team averages as the independent unit of observation. 
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𝛾 = 1 (p = 0.012 for Homogeneous and p = 0.008 for Heterogeneous) and partial reward 
power, i.e. 1 > 𝛾 > 0 (p = 0.001 for both Homogeneous and Heterogeneous). 
Figure C.3 also shows that leaders tend to appropriate a large fraction of team output, 
about 20% in Homogeneous and about 30% in Heterogeneous. Thus, delegation of reward 
power is beneficial to the leaders rather than to workers, as shown in Table C.2. In both 
treatments, combined earnings and efficiency are positively related with leaders' power. 
However, in both treatments the leaders reap most of these efficiency gains. Leaders' earnings 
increase by about 119% from 300 points in the case where they are powerless (𝛾 = 0) to 658 
points in the case where they have full reward power (𝛾 = 1). Workers' earnings also tend to 
be higher when leaders have more reward power, but the impact of leadership on workers' 
earnings is not nearly as strong as in the leaders' case. In Homogeneous workers' earnings 
increase on average by 26% between the 𝛾 = 0 and 𝛾 = 1 cases. In Heterogeneous, high 
productivity workers' earnings increase by 16% while low productivity workers' earnings 
increase by just 2%.  
Table C.3 reports fixed-effects regressions of subjects’ earnings on a set of dummy 
variables for the level of reward power delegated to the leader as well as controls for number 
of blocks and rounds. We report separate regressions for the Homogeneous and 
Heterogeneous treatments, and for leaders and workers.4 The regressions confirm that leader 
power has a strong, positive effect on leaders' earnings. In both treatments, leaders earn 
significantly more when they are granted reward power, for nearly all levels of power. In the 
Homogeneous treatment workers’ earnings are also positively associated with leader power, 
although the effect is small compared with the leaders' case. Moreover, workers' earnings 
when leaders have power greater than 0.2 are not significantly different from earnings when 
leaders have a power of 0.2 (F-tests: p = 0.202 for 𝛾 = 0.4; p = 0.239 for 𝛾 = 0.6; p =0.254 
for 𝛾 = 0.8; p = 0.132 for 𝛾 = 1). Thus while delegating some power to the leader may be 
profitable, it does not seem to pay to delegate a lot of power. Leadership is not beneficial for 
low productivity workers in heterogeneous teams: earnings are not significantly different 
between the 𝛾 = 0 case and most of the cases where leaders have reward power. In one case 
(𝛾 = 0.8), workers’ earnings are lower than when 𝛾 = 0 and the effect is significant at the 
10% level. For high productivity workers, leadership has no impact on workers' earnings. 
 
                                                          
4 Again, we also conducted random effects regressions with controls for individual characteristics and obtained 
very similar results.  
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Table C.2 – Individual earnings and efficiency 
 Homogeneous treatment  
𝛾 
 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Leader’s Earnings 
300 
(0.0) 
350 
(31.6) 
439.8 
(89.4) 
533 
(112.6) 
691.9 
(18.5) 
658.7 
(153.9) 
Workers’ Earnings 
378.1 
(65.1) 
430.8 
(72.7) 
450.2 
(66.8) 
462.1 
(50.6) 
476.5 
(26.9) 
474.6 
(64.8) 
Combined Earnings 
1812.6 
(260.6) 
2073 
(316.9) 
2240.7 
(340.7) 
2381.3 
(217.2) 
2598 
(89.1) 
2557.8 
(158.2) 
Efficiency 26% 48% 62% 73% 91% 88% 
 Heterogeneous treatment  
𝛾 
 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Leader’s Earnings 
300 
(0.0) 
365.4 
(30.5) 
437.9 
(115.5) 
464 
(100.9) 
772.5 
(193.2) 
658.4 
(192.3) 
Low Productivity Worker 
383.3 
(97.3) 
399.6 
(94.0) 
413.8 
(86.2) 
439.3 
(106.0) 
353.9 
(44.3) 
390.1 
(59.9) 
High Productivity Worker 
361.1 
(33.4) 
389.5 
(77.4) 
406.1 
(80.4) 
482.9 
(123.2) 
411.7 
(63.8) 
420 
(88.6) 
Combined Earnings 
1788.8 
(238.8) 
1943.7 
(341.1) 
2077.7 
(401.4) 
2308.5 
(413.3) 
2303.7 
(198.3) 
2278.6 
(361.9) 
Efficiency 24% 37% 48% 67% 67% 65% 
Notes: “Combined Earnings” are the sum of leader’s and workers’ earnings. “Efficiency” is 
computed as (combined earnings – 1500) / (2700 – 1500), where 1500 are the theoretical earnings 
under zero contributions and 2700 are maximum possible combined earnings. Standard deviations 
based on team averages per block in parentheses.  
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Table C.3 – Regression of earnings on leaders' power 
 Homogeneous Heterogeneous 
 
 Leaders  Workers  Leaders 
 Low 
Productivity 
Workers 
 High 
Productivity 
Workers 
0.2 
-1.40 
(30.73) 
19.47 
(23.17) 
38.63 
(30.73) 
-3.24 
(25.3.) 
2.86 
(16.03) 
0.4 
60.20 
(62.81) 
-55.59 
(41.61) 
142.06** 
(54.05) 
-16.35 
(39.81) 
23.02 
(28.56) 
0.6 
200.15*** 
(41.70) 
44.77** 
(20.15) 
99.37 
(68.23) 
-4.31 
(32.70) 
53.79 
(43.98) 
0.8 
366.74*** 
(42.34) 
67.21** 
(26.71) 
364.49*** 
(83.98) 
-71.30* 
(35.31) 
7.79 
(50.83) 
1 
390.23*** 
(55.49) 
68.93* 
(34.09) 
358.36*** 
(59.73) 
-11.67 
(30.34) 
34.65 
(25.77) 
Round 
6.51* 
(3.53) 
-4.90*** 
(1.48) 
-0.05 
(2.53) 
-3.93* 
(2.17) 
-6.33*** 
(1.65) 
Last Round Dummy 
-29.40 
(34.08) 
-21.81** 
(9.01) 
39.02 
(49.88) 
-19.48 
(17.37) 
-1.03 
(12.50) 
Block 
11.47 
(9.97) 
-0.01 
(9.76) 
22.81 
(15.09) 
-6.92 
(10.07) 
-20.35*** 
(6.36) 
Constant 
260.74*** 
(35.90) 
442.20*** 
(31.39) 
267.04*** 
(42.55) 
440.53*** 
(26.51) 
456.76*** 
(15.33) 
N. of observations 
R2 
600 
.399 
2400 
.146 
570 
.281 
1140 
.054 
1140 
.103 
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the team level reported in 
parentheses (20 clusters in Homogeneous; 19 clusters in Heterogeneous). Dependent variable is earnings. 
Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.      
 
